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Law Note
CULTURAL RESOURCES PRESERVATION AND
UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY: SOME NOTES
ON THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND A
MODEL UNDERWATER ANTIQUITIES STATUTE
The growth of underwater archaeology in the last twenty-
five years continues to provide unprecedented opportunities
to learn about past civilizations from marine antiquities. Pre-
serving cultural resources is a national policy in the United
States. Within the current statutory framework, this Note
examines the extent to which cultural resources preservation
may be extended to the seabed. It discusses seabed antiquities
jurisdiction and federal and state antiquities statutes and
concludes by setting forth a model underwater antiquities
statute-a composite of desirable features from current stat-
utes and the author's innovations-that may assist in extend-
ing historic preservation seaward.
Methought I saw a thousand fearful wrecks
Ten thousand men that fishes gnaw'd upon;
Wedges of gold, great anchors, heaps of pearl,
Inestimable stones, unvalued jewels,




Underwater Archaeology and the National Policy to Preserve
Cultural Resources
Preserving cultural resources is a national policy in the United
States. Congress has declared that "the spirit and direction of the
Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic past"' and that
"the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be
preserved. . . in order to give a sense of orientation to the American
people ... ."2 Close scrutiny of this policy reveals that a bifurcated
1. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
2. Id.
process is used in its implementation: first, protecting cultural re-
sources (including archaeological resources) from the forces of de-
struction that are multiplying and gaining momentum;3 second, pre-
serving and maintaining objects of national significance "for the
inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States."4
As modern technological advances continue to provide greater
access to the seabed and its resources, 5 the growth of underwater
archaeology in the last twenty-five years 6 continues to provide un-
precedented opportunities to learn about past civilizations from ar-
chaeological material found on the ocean floor.7 Sunken ships,8 sub-
merged cities and harbors,9 and prehistoric sites now inundated after
3. The next fifty years-some would say twenty five-are going to be the
most critical in the history of American archaeology. What is recovered,
what is preserved, and how these goals are accomplished during this
period will largely determine for all time the knowledge available to
subsequent generations of Americans concerning their heritage from
the past. It is incumbent [to do the] utmost now to insure that the
maximum amount of critical data is preserved. Our generation cannot
postpone the decision to work towards this preservation, for the forces
of destruction are multiplying and gaining momentum. The next gener-
ation cannot study or preserve what has already been destroyed.
C. McGiMsEy, PUBLIC ARCHAEOLOGY 3 (1972).
4. 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1970).
5. See J. GORES, MARINE SALVAGE (1971); Arnold & Clausen, A Magnetome-
ter Survey with Electronic Positioning Control and Calculator Plotter Sys-
tem, 4 INT'L J. NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY & UNDERWATER EXPLORATION 353 (1975);
Bascom, A Tool for Deep-WaterArchaeology, 1 INT'L J. NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLO-
GY & UNDERWATER EXPLORATION 180 (1972); Throckmorton, Edgerton, &
Yalouris, The Battle of Lepanto Search and Survey Mission (Greece), 1971-72,2
INT'L J. NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY & UNDERWATER EXPLORATION 121 (1973).
6. See H. RACKL, DrING INTO THE PAST 41-69 (1968); P. THROCEMORTON,
SHIPWRECKS AND ARCHAEOLOGY: THE UNHARVESTED SEA 169-89 (1970). In 1942
Jacques-Yves Cousteau and Emile Gagnan invented the Aqualung, a device that
enabled them to remain underwater for long periods of time with complete
freedom of movement. The inception of modern underwater archaeology oc-
curred in 1952 when Cousteau and Frederick Dumas excavated le Grand
Congloud off the coast of Marseilles. They proved that it was possible for free
divers using the Aqualung to work safely underwater for thousands of hours. In
the excavation that began as an experiment, over 200 tons of material, including
amphoras, pottery, gallery utensils, and ship fittings, were recovered over a five-
year period. It was shown that excavation of a shipwreck was not only feasible
but also worthwhile.
7. See G. BASS, ARCHAEOLOGY UNDERWATER (1970); E. BORGESE, THE DRAMA
OF THE OCEANS 49-80 (1975).
8. See P. THROCKMORTON, SHIPWRECKS AND ARCHAEOLOGY: THE UNHARVEST-
ED SA (1970). The number of wrecks is too legion to mention. Sunken vessels
may be the most concentrated archaeological assemblage available because
they represent a single day in history when the ship foundered and went to the
bottom with all its artifacts. These artifacts have rested on the ocean floor,
preserved by layers of sand and sediment, since the day of the disaster.
For an explanation of the archaeological assemblage and other related terms,
see V. CHILD, A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO ARCHAEOLOGY 9-25 (1956).
9. See Mayes & Mayes, Port Royal, Jamaica: The Archaeological Problems
and Potential, 1 INT'L J. NAUTICAL ARCHAEOLOGY & UNDERWATER EXPLORATION
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transgression of sea level'0 yield significant cultural, historical, and
scientific information. The histories of art, technology, harbors, ship-
building, and international trade, for example, have been greatly
enhanced by underwater archaeological discoveries."
However, in addition to having significant historical value,'2
marine antiquities may have substantial financial value. 13 For in-
stance, the cargoes of the Spanish treasure galleons sunk during
hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico have been estimated to be worth
hundreds of millions of dollars.' 4 While humankind has probably
always been susceptible to the lure of the deep and of sunken treas-
ure, today, for the first time in history, technology makes this treas-
97 (1972); Shaw, Greek and Roman Harbourworks, in A HISTORY OF SEAFARING
BASED ON UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY 87-112 (G. Bass ed. 1972).
10. Many prehistoric Indian sites existing along the coastline some 8,000-
10,000 years ago have survived the transgression of sea level. These sites could
be an invaluable source of prehistoric information. Interview with James Mor-
iarty, Underwater Archaeologist, Professor of Anthropology, University of San
Diego, formerly with Scripps Institute of Oceanography, in San Diego (Oct. 15,
1976).
11. The history of art. Before the discovery at Piraeus in 1959 of an
important hoard of statues, all the great Greek bronzes, with the excep-
tion of the charioteer of Delphi, had come from underwater excavations
or discoveries ....
The history of technology. The Antikythera wreck, excavated in
1900, yielded a navigational instrument, the purpose of which has only
recently been understood, and which has revealed an advanced and
even unsuspected state of ancient technology. It was an astronomical
computer indicating the movement of the sun within the signs of the
zodiac as well as the rise and setting of the principal stars.
The history of harbours. The classic study by Lehmann-Hartleben,
1923,... must be supplemented and modified on the strength of...
underwater exploration of the harbours of Tyre (1934-36). . . , Sidon,
1946 * Apollonia, 1958-59. . ., and certain other ports of north Africa
.. ,Athlit in Israel 1965-66... , Rouad, also called Arwad, Arados...,
Anthedon in Boeotia 1966... and Cosa ....
The history of international trade. The study of the distribution,
dating and composition of ancient cargoes found on the seabed....
enables us to establish important links between different regions of the
ancient world.
In all these areas, the results of underwater archaeology have added
to our previous sum of knowledge either by simple increase, or on
occasion, by revolutionizing our earlier assumptions.
Basch, Ancient Wrecks and the Archaeology of Ships, 1 INr'L J. NAUTICAL
ARCHAEOLOGY & UNDERWATER EXPLORATION 1-2 (1972).
12. This Note makes no attempt to address the philosophical notion of value,
quantitative or qualitative, or to weigh different kinds of values-for example,
historical and financial against each other. Historical value as used here
means simply having some property through which we might attain insight
concerning times past.
13. "The value of a thing / Is just as much as it will bring." K. MArx, CAPrrAL 3
n.1 (1867).
14. See J. COuSTEAu & P. DioLE, DIVING FOR SUNKEN TREASURE 12-18 (1971).
ure readily accessible. At this juncture of increased accessibility,
heightened historical interest, and rising financial value, an abund-
ance of legal issues has arisen, generated principally by attempts on
the part of state and federal governments to protect and preserve
underwater archaeological resources.
This Note identifies many of the issues and suggests a course of
action to reduce their number. It also examines the ways in which the
national policy of protecting and preserving cultural resources may
be implemented within the current legal framework relating to
marine antiquities. It begins by discussing the extent to which feder-
al and state governments have jurisdiction over objects of antiquity
located on the seabed. Beginning with thirteenth century common
law, the discussion traces the evolution of principles governing the
disposition of material abandoned at sea. The next section examines
current federal and state antiquities legislation for its capacity to
,regulate exploration for and excavation of submerged antiquities in
furtherance of the national policy of historic preservation.'5 Amend-
ments are suggested to ameliorate the weaknesses and inconsisten-
cies in these statutory schemes. The final section sets forth a model
underwater antiquities statute whose purpose is to extend the na-
tional policy of historic preservation to cover the seabed.
Limitations on the Scope of This Note
It must be emphasized at the outset that this Note does not discuss
the moral and philosophical issues arising from government inter-
vention that creates, distributes, destroys, and redistributes interests
in underwater archaeological resources. 16 Ultimately, the quest
should be to analyze the nature of the rights and duties-moral,
philosophical, and legal-of individuals, of governments, and of
humankind concerning a res with historical and cultural signifi-
cance. Does any government entity have a right to regulate the
activities of individuals interested in recovering sunken treasure?
And if so, what is the nature of this right, and what is its foundation?
How far should we tolerate governmental intrusion? Or does a gov-
ernment have a duty to protect and to preserve historical and cultur-
al resources for the edification of its citizens or all humankind? And
if so, who should define historical or cultural value and according to
which criteria? These questions are particularly intriguing, and obvi-
15. For purposes of this discussion, this Note assumes the legitimacy of a
national policy of historic preservation without questioning its philosophical or
moral underpinnings.
16. For an interesting and enlightening treatment of the issues and conse-
quences of government-induced wealth distribution, see Reisch, The New Prop-
erty, 73 YALE L.J. 773 (1964).
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ously the inquiry could continue indefinitely with ramifications that
extend far beyond the subject of underwater antiquities and historic
preservation.
UNDERWATER ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE JURISDICTION QUESTION
The Objective: To Preserve the Integrity of Underwater Archaeolog-
ical Sites
Excepting competent, systematic excavation, an archaeological
site must not be disturbed if it is to yield maximum critical data, for
the context in which an artifact is found may be as important as is
the artifact itself. Unlike some natural resources, archaeological re-
sources are non-renewable. A site that has been carelessly disrupted
may have irretrievably lost considerable significance.17 Thus, the
first step in achieving preservation of archaeological resources is
protecting them from intentional and inadvertent destruction so that
they can be properly excavated by competent professionals.
At present, treasure hunters may be the greatest single threat to
underwater archaeological resources. 18 Modern treasure hunters are
usually corporations that employ the most sophisticated detection
equipment available19 to locate and recover the vast riches of sunken
treasure fleets.20 They may have little or no concern for the ar-
17. R. HEITZER & J. GRAHAM, A GUIDE TO FIELD METHODS IN ARCHAEOLOGY 74
(1967). See also Coggins, Archaeology and the Art Market, 175 SCIENCE 263
(1972). As stated by the Committee on the Public Understanding of Archaeology
of the Society of American Archaeology: "Archaeological resources are akin to
an endangered species-even more endangered-for no matter how hard we
work to protect them, they cannot reproduce or increase." U.S. DEP'T OF INTERI-
OR, ARCHAEOLOGY AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL REsOuRCES: A GUIDE FOR THOSE PLAN-
NING TO USE, AFFECT, OR ALTER THE LAND'S SURFACE 21 (1972).
18. Other threats are simply the result of increased activities on the seabed,
such as oil and gas production, aquaculture, seabed mining, and so forth, during
which underwater archaeological resources may be inadvertantly disrupted.
Treatment of problems relating to these activities, however, is beyond the scope
of this Note.
19. See J. GORES, MARuNE SALVAGE (1971). Some of their instruments include
fathometers that assist in producing accurate maps of the seabed, side scan
sonars, proton magnetometers that provide data from which the presence of
shipwreck sites are determined and that cost more than $50,000, and various
tracking and plotting systems.
20. See J. COUSTEAU & P. DIOLE, DIVING FOR SUNKEN TREASURE 12-18 (1971).
The treasure they seek may be enormous. In the Carribean Sea, for example,
lies a coral reef known as the Silver Bank, which has claimed more wrecks per
square mile than any other spot on earth. Historians and economists have
estimated that the gold, silver, and art works now encrusted in coral may be
worth up to $600,000,000.
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chaeological significance of the wrecks they plunder, blasting them
apart with dynamite, for example, to facilitate artifact recovery.
If the national policy of historic preservation is to be extended to
cover seabed antiquities, the activities of treasure hunters must be
regulated." However, to legitimately regulate these activities, the
regulator must have jurisdiction over both the seekers and the ar-
chaeological material that is the object of their search. The following
sections discuss jurisdiction over the res.
Common Law Notions of Abandonment
The property status of the res is a linchpin issue arising from
government attempts to regulate the activities of individuals
concerned with recovering submerged antiquities. Whether an indi-
vidual or a government entity is able to demonstrate some possessory
or ownership interest in the res may have a significant impact upon
its ultimate disposition. For instance, if regulation of exploration and
excavation is necessary to implement the national policy of historic
preservation, under which circumstances may the government or an
individual legitimately establish an interest in itself so that it may
either permissibly regulate or be free from regulation? Thus, analysis
of interests in personal property that is found after having been
separated from its owner is a convenient starting point.
Of the different categories of found personal property,22 aban-
doned probably best describes marine antiquities. Abandonment
may occur either by deliberate desertion, as when objects are cast
away, or by relinquishing a search after an unintentional loss.
Abandonment in law depends upon the concurrence of intention to
abandon and some overt act, or failure to act, that carries the
21. Treasure hunters are not necessarily destructive. Some are bona fide
underwater archaeologists called treasure hunters because they deal in the
artifacts they recover. As Robert F. Marx, President of Seafinders, Inc., ex-
plains it: "Although Seafinders is essentially interested in furthering knowledge
of history and archaeology, as a private corporation requiring capital to oper-
ate, they will engage in treasure recovery as is necessary and not in conflict with
their research goals." Interview with Robert F. Marx, in New York City (Jan. 8,
1977).
22. The classifications of personal property that is found after becoming
separated from its owner are lost, mislaid, abandoned, and treasure trove. Lost
property is that which the owner parted with involuntarily through neglect,
carelessness, or inadvertance, the whereabouts of which is unknown. 1 AA1. Jun,
2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property §§ 2-3 (1962). Mislaid Property has been
intentionally left in a place where the owner can resort to it at a later time, but
subsequently forgets where it was left. Id. § 2. Abandoned Property is defined in
the text. See text accompanying notes 22-26 infra. Treasure Trove is gold or
silver coin, plate, bullion, or other specie found to have been concealed by the
owner in the earth or some private place for safekeeping. Id. § 4. See also 1
BLAcKsToNE's CovmNNARms, ch. 8, at 286 (1765).
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implication that the owner neither claims nor retains any interest.23
Thus, the essence of abandonment is that the owner has no intention
of reclaiming possession or reassuming ownership and enjoyment of
the thing in the future. The consequence of abandonment is that all
property24 has left the thing that is abandoned.
A well established common law precept is that the finder of aban-
doned property who first reduces it to possession may exercise
complete dominion and control over it. 25 Absent legislation to the
contrary,26 by the act of possession, the finder obtains the right,
within the law, of exclusive beneficial use of the thing. But if this
general rule is viable, and marine antiquities are abandoned objects,
by which authority or design may a government regulate the ac-
tivities of the finders? What becomes of the "exclusive beneficial
use" under the burden of government regulation? And how does the
concept of abandonment and the national policy of historic preserva-
tion relate to the rights and duties of the government, of individuals,
and of humankind, with regard to historic property?
These kinds of questions go to the heart of property acquisition
theory and the relationship between government and the individual.
No doubt they warrant further detailed analysis, 27 which unfortu-
nately is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Nevertheless, rais-
ing these issues makes apparent the fact that analyzing the property
status of marine antiquities is no simple task. Consider, for instance,
the uniqueness of the problems that surround search for or recovery
of objects that have become separated from their owners while they
were at sea: the res,28 the prior owner,29 the finder,3 0 the govern-
23. 1 Am. JUR. 2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property § 1 (1962).
24. In the strict legal sense property is "an aggregate of rights" to enjoy,
control, or dispose of a thing or object in any legal way, "to possess it, to use it,
and to exclude everyone else from interfering with it." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
1382 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
25. 1 AM. JuR. 2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property § 18 (1962).
26. Id. § 6.
27. At present it is hoped that an article concerning these important subjects,
as well as the moral and philosophical underpinnings of a national policy of
historic preservation, will be forthcoming.
28. Concerning the res, what exactly is the thing with which we are dealing?
How is it to be defined, for what purposes, and by whom? How is the value of the
thing to be analyzed, and can the thing be defined independently of its value(s)?
How do we distinguish historical value or cultural value from value in general
and so forth?
29. Concerning the prior owner, how did he or she acquire the res? Pur-
chase? Manufacture? Find? Gift? Theft? Pillage? Who should define these
ment,31 the chain of title,32 the accounting period,3 3 the current tech-
nology,34 cause, probability, and chance,35 and so forth. The complex-
ity is overwhelming.
Perhaps, for our present purposes, however, one need only infer
from the existence and complexity of some of these factors that the
law pertaining to abandonment at sea might have evolved to accom-
modate them. Consequently, varying rules of acquisition may have
developed.
Common Law and Abandonment at Sea: The Rule of Sovereign Pre-
rogative
At early common law, property abandoned at sea was categorized
as wreck, jetsam, flotsam, and lagan.35 Finders' rights attached ac-
terms and for which purposes? Does the manner of acquisition by the prior
owner have any effect on the ultimate disposition of the res? Does the manner of
separation from the prior owner make any difference? Sold? Abandoned? Lost?
Stolen? Given away? Inadvertantly dropped in a place where the technology is
not available to retrieve it?
30. Concerning the finder of the res, who should make this characterization,
and for which purpose? Was the res acquired by theft, discovery, gift, purchase?
What is the significance of the fact that the finder found the location of the res
through investigation of the naval archives? Or that the finder developed the
technology to recover the res that everyone knew was out there?
31. Concerning the government, is it the definer of the res? Is it the definer of
interests in the res? Is the government the acquisition-arbiter among competing
claims? Is it the protector of the prior owners' or finders' interests in the res, or
is it a protector of the res for future generations?
32. Concerning the chain of title, what is the mechanism by which ownership
is traced? How is title obtained? Finders keepers, losers weepers? Is possession
nine points of the law? Does the government have an ultimate reversionary
interest in all property?
33. Concerning the accounting period, is there any statute of limitation on
claims to the res, and against whom does it run and for which purpose? If so,
how can the statute be tolled? At which point may we ignore prior claims to the
res, including those of the former owner? Are there any restraints upon aliena-
tion? What is the effect of time on the prior owner-finder relationship? What is
the effect of "historical value" upon any of these questions?
34. Concerning the current technology, does "lost" plus "technology" equal
found? What is the relationship of technology to ownership concepts? Does the
developer of the technology that enabled the "finder" of the res to recover it
have an interest in the res? Why, or why not? What is the effect of technology on
notions of abandonment? May the prior owners be said to have intended to
relinquish their claims to a res when they simply did not have the technology to
search for or to recover it?
35. Concerning cause, probability, and chance, does anyone own good luck?
Is technology merely the conversion of chance into probability? What is the
difference between "that's mine because I worked hard for it," and "that's mine
because windfalls belong to the windfallee"?
36. Wreck, by the antient common law, was where any ship was lost at
sea, and the goods or cargo were thrown upon the land .... Jetsam is
where goods are cast into the sea, and there sink and remain under the
water: flotsam is where they continue swimming on the surface of the
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cordingly. For example, wreck, material from a ship lost at sea
that somehow reaches shore, belonged to the Crown according to
sovereign prerogative.3 Later, in 1275, this principle was codified
in the Statute of Westminster.38 The Statute refers to wreck only,
however, and is thought to have been intended to favor distressed
proprietors by allowing them to sue to recover their goods within a
year and a day of the loss. 39 When this period expired, title to the
merchandise vested in the Crown.
In 1601, the Constable's Case4 ° held that sovereign prerogative
extended to the other categories of objects abandoned at sea.4 1 Then
in 1798, an admiralty court stated in The Aquila42 its belief that the
general rule of civilized countries was that property found aban-
doned at sea belonged to the sovereign.4 3 Subsequent English deci-
waves: Ligan [also known as lagan] is where they are sunk in the sea,
tied to a cork or buoy, in order to be found again.
1 BLACKSTONE'S COMIENTARIES, ch. 8, at 280-82 (1765).
37. Id. at 280. "[F]or it was held, that, by the loss of the ship, all property was
gone out of the original owner." Id.
38. Concerning wrecks of the sea, it is agreed, that where a man, a dog, or
a cat escape quick out of the ship, that such ship nor barge, nor any
thing within them, shall be adjudged wreck; but the goods shall be saved
and kept by view of the sheriff, coroner, or king's bailiff, and delivered
into the hands of such as are of the town where the goods were found; so
that if any sue for these goods, and after prove that they were his, or
perished in his keeping, within a year and a day, they shall be restored to
him without delay; and if not, they shall remain to the king and be seized
by the sheriffs, coroners, and bailiffs, and shall be delivered to them of
the town, which shall answer before the justices of the wreck belonging
to the king.
Statute of Westminster, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 4.
39. See 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, ch. 8, at 280-81 (1765).
40. 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601).
41. Id. at 223. The Court of King's Bench determined that the Statute was
merely a codification of the common law and "therefore, all that which is
provided as to wreck extends also to flots, jetsam and lagan." Id.
42. 165 Eng. Rep. 87 (Adm. 1798). The Aquila involved a derelict Swedish
ship. The vessel was returned to the owners, but the cargo remained unclaimed.
The finders vied with the king for ownership of the cargo.
43. It is certainly very true that property may be so acquired [that is, by
possession]; but the question is, to whom is it acquired? By the law of
nature, to the individual finder or occupant: But in a state of civil
society, although property may be acquired by occupancy, it is not
necessarily acquired to the occupant himself for the positive regulations
of the State may have made alterations on the subject; and may, for
reasons of public peace and policy, have appropriated it to other per-
sons, as, for instance, to the State itself, or to its grantees.
It will depend, therefore, on the law of each country to determine,
whether property so acquired by occupancy, shall accrue to the indi-
vidual finder, or to the Sovereign and his representatives? and I con-
sider it to be the general rule of civilized countries, that what is found
derelict on the seas, is acquired beneficially for the Sovereign, if no
Marine Antiquities Preservation[VOL, 15: 623, 1978]
sions have supported this holding. 4
Thus, the rule of sovereign prerogative appears to diverge from the
usual abandoned property concept. At common law, property aban-
doned at sea is acquired for the exclusive beneficial use of the
sovereign rather than of the finder. This rule could have important
ramifications for extending the national policy of historic preserva-
tion to cover the seabed. The sovereign with complete dominion and
control over the res, for example, might legitimately regulate its
acquisition. Therefore, the sovereign might be able to prevent unau-
thorized excavation of submerged archaeological resources through
conscientious regulation of treasure hunting activities.
Sovereign Prerogative in the United States: An American Rule?
In the United States the status of the sovereign prerogative doc-
trine is unclear. Although British courts consistently conclude that
title to property abandoned at sea vests in the sovereign, courts in the
United States appear to favor the finder.45 Some say that a basic
sovereign right exists but that unless it is legislatively asserted, the
finder must prevail.46
Several commentators, apparently attempting to establish certain-
ty where none exists, have labelled these doctrines the British Rule
and the American Rule.47 It is not altogether clear, however, that a
dichotomy exists or that the courts in the United States are bound to
follow an American Rule. For example, when historic properties have
been involved, some courts in the United States have favored the
owner shall appear. Seldon . .. lays it down as a right annexed to
sovereignty, and acknowledged amongst all nations ancient and mod-
ern. Loccenius ... mentions it as an incontestable right of sovereignty
in the north of Europe. Valin ... ascribes the same right to the crown of
France. . . In England, this right is as firmly established as any one
prerogative of the crown.
Id. at 89.
44. See, e.g., The King v. Two Casks of Tallow, 166 Eng. Rep. 414 (Adm. 1837)
(two casks washed up on shore); H.M.S. Thetis, 166 Eng. Rep. 390 (Adm. 1835)
(vessels with cargo lying on the bottom of the ocean); Talbot v. Lewis, 172 Eng.
Rep. 1383 (Adm. 1834) (valuable coins found upon the shore); The King v. Prop-
erty Derelict, 166 Eng. Rep. 136 (Adm. 1825) (gold watches and coins found upon
a vessel drifting abandoned at sea).
45. See, e.g., Thompson v. One Anchor & Two Anchor Chains, 221 F. 770(W.D. Wis. 1915); United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820 (1st Cir. 1902); Rickard v.
Pringle, 293 F. Supp. 981 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Brady v. The Steamship African
Queen, 179 F. Supp. 321,'(E.D. Va. 1960); Wiggins v. 1100 Tons, More or Less,
of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960).
46. See, e.g., Sara E. Thompson v. United States, 62 Ct. Cl. 516 (1926).
47. See Beall, State Regulation of Search for and Salvage of Sunken Treas-
ure, 4 NAT. RESOURCEs LAW. 1, 14-17 (1971); Kenny & Hrusoff, The Ownership of
the Treasures of the Sea, 9 WM. & MARY L. R.v. 383, 383-98 (1967); Note, Aban-
doned Property: Title to Treasure Recovered in Florida's Territorial Waters,
21 U. FLA. L. Rav. 360, 361-66 (1969).
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sovereign over the finder.48 Thus, reliance upon these labels tends to
confuse the issue of title to underwater archaeological resources.
Murphy v. Dunham
Commentators have relied upon several theories to support their
belief in the separate existence of an American Rule. Some rely upon
the holding of Murphy v. Dunham,49 which states that courts in the
United States easily find exception to the British Rule and prefer the
finder over the sovereign.
Murphy v. Dunham was a libel action for tortious conversion of
coal in a vessel that had sunk in Lake Michigan.50 The respondent
sought to use the Statute of Westminster to divest the libellant of his
interest in the coal "by reason of his failure to appear within a year
and a day to make claim to it."'" But the court rejected this conten-
tion, stating that the coal was not technically "wreck of the sea," so
the Statute of Westminster had "no application to the case under
consideration."5 2
Apparently, the Murphy court expressed no opinion about the
sovereign's rights in the coal or about the acceptance or rejection of
48. See Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F. Supp.
356 (S.D. Tex. 1973); State v. Flying "W" Enterprises, Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 160
S.E.2d 482 (1968). Although Platoro Ltd., Inc. was reversed and remanded with
directions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the theoretical basis for the
original holding is nevertheless viable. See Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified
Remains of a Vessel, 508 F.2d 1113 (1975).
49. 38 F. 503 (E.D. Mich. 1889). For the commentators' discussion of this case,
see Kenny & Hrusoff, The Ownership of the Treasure of the Sea, 9 WM. & MAIRY
L. REv. 383, 393-94 (1967); Note, Abandoned Property: Title to Treasure Re-
covered in Florida's Territorial Waters, 21 FLA. L. REV. 360, 365 (1969).
50. 38 F. 503, 504-05 (E.D. Mich. 1889). Respondent Dunham owned a schooner
that had sunk in a storm while carrying a cargo of coal. Respondent abandoned
all his rights in the insured part of the vessel to his underwriters, reserving,
however, the benefit of salvage in the uninsured part. The underwriters then
sold the vessel to libellant Murphy, who later located the wreck and was the first
finder. Murphy determined that it could not be saved. Subsequently, corre-
spondence ensued whereby Dunham requested-authorization to raise the vessel,
which request Murphy refused. Respondent Dunham salvaged 981 tons of coal
despite libellant Murphy's refusal to authorize this action and sold the coal at a
private sale. Murphy then sued for tortious conversion. Id. at 504-05.
51. Id. at 509. See also Statute of Westminster, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 4; note 38
supra.
52. 38 F. at 508-09. The court apparently did not consider British decisions
subsequent to the Statute of Westminster which extended sovereign prerogative
to all kinds of material abandoned at sea. See, e.g., The Aquila, 165 Eng. Rep. 87
(Adm. 1798); Constables Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601); text accompanying
notes 40-44 supra.
sovereign prerogative only because the doctrine was not applicable
to the facts of that case.53 Moreover, because neither the United
States nor any individual state was a party to the litigation, the
sovereign's rights were not at issue.54 Thus, Murphy v. Dunham does
not appear to support a theory of distinct American and British Rules
of sovereign prerogative.
Devolution
Another theory suggests that the American Rule-British Rule
dichotomy exists because the common law rule of sovereign preroga-
tive did not devolve to the United States. This theory maintains that
because the British Rule was not firmly established until 1798 in The
Aquila decision, courts in the United States are not obliged to follow
it. That is, they are not bound to follow a common law rule that was
adopted twenty-two years after the Declaration of Independence.55
Firmly established or not, the doctrine of sovereign prerogative
later advanced in The Aquila was recognized in the American
Colonies and enforced by the Crown's Admiralty Courts there prior
to the American Revolution.56 Whether devolution occurred after the
principle was firmly established in The Aquila seems irrelevant when
the principle was in fact acknowledged and enforced in the Colonies
prior to independence. Thus, the anti-devolution theory does not
appear to support the notion of a distinct American Rule.
Legislative Assertion
Perhaps the most acceptable theory of a distinct American Rule
suggests that the sovereign has the bare right to ownership of a res
abandoned at sea, but that the right must be legislatively asserted.
Otherwise the finder prevailsY.5  Thus, the court held in Sara E.
53. The court ruled that the Statute of Westminster and the doctrine of
sovereign prerogative had "no-applicatibn to the case under consideration." 38
F. at 509.
54. See note 50 supra.
55. See Beall, State Regulation of Search for and Salvage of Sunken Treas-
ure, 4 NAT. RESOURCEs LAw. 1, 16 (1971); Kenny & Hrusoff, The Ownership of
the Treasures of the Sea, 9 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 383,393 (1967); Note, Abandoned
Property: Title to Treasure Recovered in Florida's Territorial Waters, 21 U.
FLA. L. REV. 360, 365 (1969).
56. See 2 J. KENT, COMIENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 260 (5th ed. 1844): "[B]y
the colony laws of Massachusetts and Connecticut, wrecks were preserved for
the owner; and if found at sea, they were supposed to belong now to the United
States, as succeeding in this respect, to the prerogative of the English Crown."
57. See Beall, State Regulation of Search for and Salvage of Sunken Treas-
ure, 4 NAT. REsouRcFs LAw. 1, 16 (1971); Kenny & Hrusoff, The Ownership of
the Treasures of the Sea, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 383, 394-97 (1967); Note, A ban-
doned Property: Title to Treasure Recovered in Florida's Territorial Waters,
21 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 360, 365-66 (1969).
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Thompson v. United States :
58
It seems well settled that when a vessel is derelict and abandoned in
the navigable waters of the United States or anywhere else it belongs
to that person who finds it and reduces it to possession. Congress
could undoubtedly provide that the proceeds of derelicts and aban-
doned vessels in the navigable waters of the United States be paid into
the Treasury; but no such law has been passed, and until it is the
principles of natural law must prevail.59
This theory appears to be widely accepted.60 Indeed, the existence
of a distinct American Rule might go unquestioned were it not for
three recent decisions that favor the sovereign despite the absence of
a legislative assertion of sovereign prerogative.6' The holding in
Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel6 2 is representa-
tive of this approach. "Under the better view and what this court
believes to be the common law adopted by Texas and the United
States, abandoned 'wrecks of the sea', including both vessels and
cargo, belong, on recovery, to the sovereign, unless claimed by the
58. 62 Ct. Cl. 516 (1926). This litigation concerned title to an iron tanker that
had sunk in the Mississippi River.
59. Id. at 524.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Tyndale, 116 F. 820 (1st Cir. 1902). This case
involved a sum of money found on a body floating on the high seas. The court
ruled that
it would have been appropriate, and within its constitutional powers, for
congress to have taken control of this fund; but it has not done so. There
is neither any statute nor any settled practice which requires the treas-
urer of the United States to receive it, or authorizes us to direct that it
shall be received by [the treasury].
Id. at 821. See also the cases cited note 45 supra.
61. See Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F. Supp.
356 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd and remanded with directions to dismiss, 508 F.2d
1113 (1975) (Plaintiff sought to establish a claim to a Spanish vessel that had
sunk c. 1554 in the Gulf of Mexico, but the court ruled that the vessel and its
cargo belonged to the state of Texas.); State v. Flying "W" Enterprizes, Inc., 273
N.C. 399, 160 S.E.2d 482 (1968) (North Carolina sought to enjoin the defendant's
salvage of blockade runners that had sunk c. 1700, and the court concluded that
the hulks belonged to the state in its sovereign capacity.). In State v. Mas-
sachusetts Co., 95 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1956), litigation was initiated by Florida to
enjoin a salvage company from salvaging a wreck of the battleship Mas-
sachusetts. The court held
that the wreck of the vessel is a "derelict" which, at common law, would
belong to the Crown in its office of Admiralty at the end of a year and a
day, under the authority of the English cases above cited [including the
Statute of Westminster, Constable's Case, The Aquila, and their
progeny]; that since the property was resting in the territorial waters of
the State of Florida ... it... belongs to the State in its sovereign
capacity.
Id. at 910. Concerning Platoro Ltd., Inc., see also note 48 supra.
62. 371 F. Supp. 356 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd and remanded with directions to
dismiss, 508 F.2d 1113 (1975). See also note 48 supra.
owner within a year and a day."'6 3 Apparently some courts do not
believe that they are bound by an American Rule of sovereign pre-
rogative.
Summary: Another View
Thus, in the United States the status of the doctrine of sovereign
prerogative remains unclear. Although most judicial decisions
concerning title to property abandoned at sea have held for the
finders, some recent cases have been decided in favor of the
sovereign. Concerning the ultimate disposition of the res, it is not
possible, as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, to ascertain a
clear, convincing, guiding principle from the commentaries and
many judicial opinions on the subject.
Even though the issue of the existence of a distinct American Rule
remains ,unresolved, these inconsistent holdings can perhaps be re-
conciled, for one .subtle distinction can be found in the facts of the
cases. When the abandoned res is something that might be acquired
for the beneficial use and enjoyment of many people over a long
period of time, the courts have favored the sovereign64-the sovereign
takes on behalf of its people. In Platoro Ltd., Inc., 5 for instance,
articles of unique historical and cultural significance were retained
by the State of Texas for public use and enjoyment in museums.
However, in the cases holding for the finders, the litigation con-
cerned title to fungible goods66-important perhaps only for the sal-
vage value to the finder.
This distinction may not be dispositive of the issue of entitlement
to abandoned objects with historical significance,6 7 but it might pro-
vide a clue. Perhaps, according to some utilitarian calculus,68 it is
permissible to say that because they yield priceless historical and
63. Id. at 360.
64. See Platoro Ltd., Inc. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 371 F. Supp.
356 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd and remanded with directions to dismiss, 508 F.2d
1113 (1975) (objects of unique cultural and historical significance retained by
Texas for museum display); State v. Massachusetts Co., 95 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1956)
(fishing reef created by an abandoned battleship preserved for sport fishing);
State ' .Flying "W" Enterprizes, Inc., 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E. 2d 482 (1968) (objects
of u'nique cultural and historical significance retained by North Carolina for
museum display).
65. 371 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd and remanded with directions to
dismiss, 508 F.2d 1113 (1975). See also note 48 supra.
66. See, e.g., Russel v. Forty Bales of Cotton, 21 F. Cas. 42 (S.D. Fla. 1872);
Peabody v. Proceeds of 28 Bags of Cotton, 19 F. Cas. 39 (D. Mass. 1870); Wiggins
v. 1100 Tons, More or Less, of Italian Marble, 186 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Va. 1960);
Murphy v. Dunham, 38 F. 503 (E.D. Mich. 1889).
67. For a discussion of the complexity of abandonment at sea, especially
when "historic properties" are concerned, see notes 22-35 and accompanying
text supra.
68. See J. MILL, UT=ARLAmsM (1863).
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cultural information, abandoned objects of antiquity are more valu-
able to humankind than to individual salvors.69 Thus, when no statu-
tory authority and only conflicting case precedent exist, this kind of
philosophical inquiry might provide some useful insight.
At any rate, entitlement to the res might have some bearing on
attempts to extend the national policy of historic preservation to
cover the seabed,70 for a sovereign legitimately entitled to the aban-
doned objects of antiquity found on the ocean floor might be able to
regulate their acquisition so as to preclude trespass and to encourage
systematic excavation. But the spectre remains of an all-encom-
passing sovereign prerogative, and courts have yet to articulate a
satisfactory principle that reconciles the conflicting holdings. There-
fore, perhaps the best approach to implementing historic preserva-
tion of marine archaeological resources in the United States is to
firmly establish the now uncertain requirement of a legislative asser-
tion of sovereign prerogative.
Legislative Assertion of Sovereign Prerogative
The Abandoned Property Act
Because of the inability to conclusively refute the American Rule,
it should be acknowledged, and a legislative assertion of sovereign
prerogative should be sought. The Abandoned Property Act of 187071
might satisfy these requirements.
The Abandoned Property Act authorizes the Administrator of Gen-
eral Services
to make such contracts and provisions as he [or she] may deem for the
interest of the Government, for the preservation, sale, or collection of
any property,. . . which may have been wrecked, abandoned, or be-
come derelict, being within the jurisdiction of the United States, and
which ought to come to the United States.72
The sweeping language of this statute apparently allows the Ad-
ministrator to acquire any wrecked or abandoned property that may
be deemed to be of interest to the sovereign. However, the qualifica-
69. This statement begs several important questions, the most obvious of
which, perhaps, concern the nature of "value" of "historical" or "cultural"
objects and the right-duty relationships of the state, the individual, and humani-
ty. Inquiries of this sort are beyond the scope of this Note, but hopefully, they
will be the subject of a forthcoming article.
70. See text accompanying notes 1-15 supra.
71. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970).
72. Id.
tion, "which ought to come to the United States," may raise some
barriers against this expansive interpretation.
Thus, in Russell v. Forty Bales of Cotton,73 an 1872 decision, a
district court concluded that the phrase "ought to come to the United
States" defined the kind of property over which the Act granted
jurisdiction. The court held that the Act applied only to abandoned
property that had been involved in "naval and military operations"
during the Civil War and that it "should come to the United States,
either from being originally the property of the United States, or the
property of the public enemy. '74 This view was reiterated in United
States v. Tyndale,7 decided in 1902, which held that the statute
"relates, apparently, to property which ought equitably to go to the
United States, and not to wreckage of any kind."76
A consideration of the statute as it was originally enacted may help
to explain these holdings. The Act read:
[Abandoned property]. . . which ought to come to the United States,
or any moneys, dues, and other interests lately in the possession of or
due to the so-called Confederate States, or their agents, and now
belonging to the United States, which are now withheld or retained
by any person, corporation or municipality whatever, and which
ought to come into the possession and custody of, or been collected or
received by, the United States.77
The italicized language was omitted as obsolete during codification
in 1965.
78
Because the Abandoned Property Act no longer explicitly refers to
property "lately in the possession of. . .the so-called Confederate
States," perhaps a more expansive reading of the Act is permissible.
Indeed, since codification, the Act has been used routinely by the
federal government as the statutory authority under which it ad-
ministers its historic properties. 79 Recently, for instance, under the
73. 21 F. Cas. 42 (S.D. Fla. 1872).
74. Id. at 43.
75. 116 F. 820 (lst Cir. 1902).
76. Id. at 822.
77. Abandoned Property Act of 1870, June 21, 1870, Res. No. 75, 16 Stat. 380
(codified at 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970)).
78. Pub. L. No. 89-30, § 4, 79 Stat. 119.
79. Interview with Michael W. Reed, Attorney, Marine Resources Section,
Land and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, in
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 29, 1976). Archaeologists excavating government-owned
sites under permit from the Secretary of the Interior may contract with the
Administrator of General Services (the Secretary of the Treasury prior to 1965)
according to the Abandoned Property Act if they wish to keep any of the
artifacts which they recover. These contracts usually provide for a 50-50 split of
the recovered artifacts between the government and the archaeologist. See 40
U.S.C. § 310 (1970). See also S. REP. No. 234, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
[1965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1575, 1577: "The Department [of the Treas-
ury (before codification when the responsibilities were shifted to the Adminis-
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authority of the Abandoned Property Act, the United States
contracted for the excavation of a nineteenth-century steamboat that
had sunk in the Missouri River.80
At present, the Abandoned Property Act is also routinely used in
conjunction with federal antiquities legislation to protect, preserve,
sell, and collect terrestrial antiquities within federal jurisdiction.
Thus, the government is able to regulate excavation and to prohibit
unauthorized interference with terrestrial archaeological sites.81
The Abandoned Property Act might be acknowledged as a legisla-
tive assertion of the sovereign's prerogative concerning submerged
antiquities. Perhaps abandoned historic property "ought to come to
the United States" in the interest of preserving the nation's heri-
tage.82 But are underwater archaeological resources "within the
jurisdiction of the United States," as the Abandoned Property Act
requires? And if they are, may the government use the Abandoned
Property Act in conjunction with current antiquities legislation to
extend the national policy of historic preservation to include the
seabed?
The Antiquities Act
The federal government takes the position that submerged anti-
quities located on the outer continental shelf8" are protected by the
trator of General Services)] during the past ten years, has entered into twelve
contracts for salvage of wrecked, abandoned or derelict property."
80. See J. PETscHE, THE STEAiMBOAT BERTRAND (1974). See also Corbino v.
United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 278,488 F.2d 1008 (1973), aff'd on rehearing, 208 Ct. Cl.
1002 (1976).
81. See The Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431-433 (1970). According to
the provisions of this Act, unauthorized people are forbidden to "appropriate,
excavate, injure, or destroy any.., object of antiquity" on government land
without first obtaining a permit from the Secretary of the Interior. Id. § 433.
Permits are issued only to "reputable museums, universities, colleges, or other
recognized scientific or educational institutions." Id. § 432. See also 43 C.F.R. §
3.10 (1976) (reports must be made to the Smithsonian Institution at regular
intervals); id. § 3.14 (a government field officer may examine the excavation at
any time).
82. See 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970). See also text accompanying notes 1-15 supra.
83. See 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). The outer continental shelf has been defined as
"all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath
navigable waters as defined in [the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §
1301 (1970)], and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States
and are subject to its jurisdiction and control." See also Pres. Proc. No. 2667,3
C.F.R. 67 (1945), reprinted in 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 485 (1945). According to the
Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 1(a), done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958,15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 449 U.N.T.S. 311, the continental shelf is "the
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Antiquities Act of 1906.84 This position raises substantially the same
issue as that raised by the Abandoned Property Act: Does the United
States have jurisdiction over archaeological resources on the seabed?
The Antiquities Act authorizes the President to declare "objects of
historical or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands own-
ed or controlled by the Government of the United States to be nation-
al monuments. ' 85 However, whether the provisions of this Act apply
to archaeological resources on the seabed necessarily depends upon
whether the seabed is land "owned or controlled" by the federal
government.
This question was addressed for the first time in Treasure Salvors,
Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 86 decided in 1976. There a district
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside of
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres."
84. Letter from Michael W. Reed, Attorney, Marine Resources Section, Land
and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, to James
Kevin Meenan (Aug. 24, 1976). See Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433
(1970) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
86. 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2151 (5th Cir.
Apr. 28, 1976). On September 5, 1622, a Spanish fleet of twenty-eight ships
encountered a hurricane in the Straits of Florida. Eight vessels carrying 550
people and cargoes of gold, silver, and jewels worth more than one and one half
million ducats-in modem terms perhaps 250 million dollars-were lost, On
July 4, 1973, Treasure Salvors, Inc., a modern treasure hunting corporation,
located one of the ships, the Nuestra Sefiora de Atocha, and began recovering
the treasure. See Lyon, The Trouble with Treasure, 149 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIc 787
(1976). The wreck site is approximately 10 nautical miles west of the Marquesa
Keys on submerged lands until recently claimed to be within Florida's bound-
aries. Florida, like a number of coastal states, claims title to objects of antiquity
found on state submerged lands, and it rigidly controls recovery of all artifacts.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.011-267.14 (West 1977). The plaintiffs, Treasure Sal-
vors, Inc., entered a series of contracts with the state to explore for and excavate
the Atocha site. Their work was closely supervised by state agents aboard the
salvage vessels for five years. The contract called for a split of the recovered
treasure between the salvors and the state in order to assure that a representa-
tive sample of artifacts would be preserved for museum display. For an expla-
nation of the Florida Archives and History Act, see Note, Abandoned Property:
Title to Treasure Recovered in Florida's Territorial Waters, 21 U. FLA. L. Rv.
360, 369-77 (1969). On March 17, 1975, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of its
Special Master in United States v. Florida, which held that the submerged
lands that include the Atocha wreck site are outside Florida's jurisdictional
limits and fall under the control of the United States. S. Ct. No. 52 Original
(March 17, 1975). The plaintiffs then repudiated their contracts with Florida and
filed this action to establish their sole right to the Atocha and its tackle, apparel,
cargo, and armament. The State of Florida and the Department of the Interior
immediately requested the Department of Justice to intervene to protect the
objects of antiquity that had now been determined to lie on the outer continental
shelf. On September 11, 1975, the federal government intervened and asserted a
federal claim to these objects. This claim, like the claim made earlier by the
State of Florida, is based on sovereign prerogative, especially as it has been
legislatively asserted in the Antiquities Act (16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970)) and the
Abandoned Property Act (40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970)). Interview with Michael W.
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court stated that "the sole issue to be resolved. . . is whether the
provisions of the Antiquities Act. . .or of the Abandoned Property
Act ...are applicable to the salvage of a shipwreck discovered on
the continental shelf outside the territorial waters of the United
States." 87 In granting summary judgment for the plaintiffs, the court
concluded that the Acts did not apply because "the property of the
wreck involved in this case is neither within the jurisdiction of the
United States nor owned or controlled by our government." 88
The Treasure Salvors, Inc. holding may have been unduly narrow.
At any rate, within the current federal statutory scheme it stands as a
roadblock to efforts to extend the national policy of historic preser-
vation to cover the seabed. However, if some legitimate basis exists
for the proposition that the seabed is land "owned or controlled" by
the federal government, the provisions of the Antiquities Act89 might
apply to submerged antiquities. And if so, it might qualify, like the
Abandoned Property Act,90 as a legislative assertion of sovereign
prerogative by which the United States would be entitled to benefi-
cial use of the res. The next inquiry, therefore, must concern seabed
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the Seabed
The Truman Proclamation
The Truman Proclamation of 194591 was the beginning of the quest
for federal jurisdiction over the submerged lands and resources of the
continental shelf. President Truman declared that "the Government
of the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and
the seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contig-
uous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United
States .... ,92
Shortly thereafter, the federal government became entangled in
litigation with several states over title to the natural resources of the
Reed, Attorney, Marine Resources Section, Land and Natural Resources Divi-
sion, United States Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 29, 1976).
87. 408 F. Supp. 907, 908 (S.D. Fla. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2151 (5th
Cir. Apr. 28, 1976).
88. Id. at 910.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
90. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970).
91. Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1945), reprinted in 13 DEP'T STATE BULL.
485 (1945).
92. Id.
adjacent seabed of both the territorial sea9" and the continental
shelf.9 4 The Supreme Court recognized that plenary control over
these submerged lands vested in the federal government" and that
this control extended beyond natural resources. 96
The Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act
The states returned empty-handed from the litigation with the
federal government over title to seabed resources. Congress, there-
fore, enacted the Submerged Lands Act (SLA)9 7 and the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),98 which gave the resources and
submerged lands in the territorial sea to the coastal states9 and
retained control over the continental shelf for the United States. 00
The next question is whether these Acts conferred jurisdiction over
archaeological resources as well as natural resources. In Treasure
93. The territorial sea is an area of the water, seabed, and air extending a
defined distance seaward of, and perpendicular to, the established coastal
baseline. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done
at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
94. The continental shelf is "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres."
Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 83, art. l(a).
95. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804 (1947). "The United States of
America is now, and has been at all times pertinent hereto, possessed of
paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the lands, minerals and
other things underlying the Pacific Ocean ... and outside the inland waters."
Id. at 805; accord, United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
96. See United States v. Texas, 399 U.S. 707 (1950).
Today the controversy is over oil. Tomorrow it may be over some
other substance or mineral or perhaps the bed of the ocean itself. If the
property, whatever it may be, lies seaward of the low-water mark, its
use, disposition, management, and control involve national interests and
national responsibilities.
Id. at 719 (emphasis added).
97. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
98. Id. § 1331.
99. See id. § 1311.
It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that... title
to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the
boundaries of the respective States, and the natural resources within
such lands and waters ... are ... recognized, confirmed, established,
and vested in and assigned to the respective States.
The seaward boundary of each original coastal State is approved and
confirmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast-
line ....
Id. at § 1312. In addition, Florida and Texas received grants of up to three
marine lesgues, or nine geographical miles, along their Gulf of Mexico coasts.
See id. § 1301(b). See also United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United
States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
100. See 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970). "It is declared to be the policy of the United
States that the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to
the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of
disposition, as provided in this subchapter."
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Salvors, Inc., the court concluded that the SLA and the OCSLA
granted jurisdiction over only minerals of the seabed'01 and not
sunken vessels. 0 2 Archaeological resources, the court reasoned, are
not "natural resources" as this term is defined in these Acts, 0 3 and
because jurisdiction does not extend to antiquities located on the
seabed, the provisions of the Antiquities Act'0 4 and the Abandoned
Property Act'01 are not applicable to underwater archaeological re-
sources.
10 6
This part of the Treasure Salvors, Inc. holding may have been
unduly narrow because the SLA and the OCSLA granted plenary
control over the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf, as well
as over its natural resources. 0 7 The Senate Report on the OCSLA, for
101. 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2151 (5th Cir.
Apr. 28, 1976). "However, [the OCSLA merely asserts jurisdiction over the
minerals in and under the continental shelf." Id. at 910.
102. Id. Treasure Salvors, Inc. cites Guess v. Reed, 290 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 957 (1962), to support this proposition. Guess holds that
"the Continental Shelf Lands Act was enacted for the purpose, primarily, of
asserting ownership of and jurisdiction over the minerals in and under the
Continental Shelf." Id. at 625. Guess, however, did not concern ownership and
control of the continental shelf, and indeed, the United States was not even a
party to the litigation. Rather, Guess was a wrongful death action arising out of
a helicopter crash in the waters above the outer continental shelf. The plaintiffs
attempted to join the insurers of the helicopter's manufacturer under
Louisiana's Direct Action Statute. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1959). This
statute applies, however, only if the injury occurred within the State of Louisia-
na, and the court would therefore not permit the joinder. Because the OCSLA
adopts state law as federal law for certain purposes, plaintiffs sought a ruling
that state law applied to the water column where the crash occurred. The court
held:
Jurisdiction was asserted over "the subsoil and seabed" of the outer
Continental Shelf. It is only for "that portion of the subsoil and seabed
of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures
erected thereon" that the State law applies.This does not include the sea
above the subsoil and the seabed and does not include the air above the
sea.
290 F.2d at 625 (citation omitted).
103. 408 F. Supp. at 910.
104. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
105. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970).
106. 408 F. Supp. at 910.
107. See 43 U.S.C. § 1311 (1970) ("title to and ownership of the lands beneath
the navigable waters.., and... the natural resources.., are ... recognized
." (emphasis added)); id. § 1332 ("the subsoil and seabed... appertain to
the United States, and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of
disposition. . . ." (emphasis added)). For a judicial support of the proposition
that federal jurisdiction extends to the subsoil and seabed of the outer continen-
tal shelf, see United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 526 (1975) ("Congress emphat-
ically implemented its view that the United States has paramount rights to the
seabed beyond the three mile limit when ... it enacted the [OCSLA] in 1954.");
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example, asserts that "the jurisdiction and plenary control of the
United States is extended to the seabed and subsoil of the entire
continental shelf. . . instead of merely to the natural resources of
the subsoils and the seabed."'10 8
It is not unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that jurisdiction over
the seabed and subsoil should include jurisdiction over the underwa-
ter archaeological resources located therein. True, archaeological
resources are not natural resources, but perhaps natural resources
should be liberally construed to include them.1 9 At any rate, it is a
fundamental tenet of property law that abandoned property lodged
in the soil belongs to the owner of the soil."'
The explicit plenary control over the seabed and subsoil, in
conjunction with a liberal construction of natural resources, leads to
the reasonable conclusion that the federal government should have
jurisdiction over underwater archaeological resources located on the
seabed. If this assumption is correct, the Abandoned Property Act
and the Antiquities Act should enable the government to extend the
national policy of historic preservation to include the seabed."'
The United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf
The Treasure Salvors, Inc. court further frustrated the govern-
ment's claims of jurisdiction over underwater archaeological re-
sources when it held that the Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf 12 would not permit liberal construction of natural re-
sources."' The Convention provides that "[t]he coastal state exer-
cises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of
United States v. California, 382 U.S. 448 (1966); United States v. Louisiana, 363
U.S. 1 (1960).
108. S. REP. N0.441, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1953) (emphasis added).
109. See Auburn, Convention for Preservation of Man's Heritage in the
Ocean, 185 SCIENCE 763 (1974). "For purposes of the Continental Shelf Conven-
tion the term 'natural resources' should be deemed to include archaeological
and cultural artifacts, and wrecks not less than 100 years old." Id. at 764.
110. See 1 AM. JuR. 2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property § 4 (1962).
111. For examples of national monuments that include offshore submerged
lands, see 16 U.S.C. § 450 qq (1970) (Biscayne National Monument); Pres. Proc.
No. 3443, reprinted in 76 Stat. 1441 (1961) (Buck Island Reef); Pres. Proc. No.
2281, reprinted in 52 Stat. 1541 (1938) (Channel Islands [enlarged to include
submerged lands by Pres. Proc. No. 2825, reprinted in 63 Stat. 1258 (1949)]);
Pres. Proc. No. 2112, reprinted in 49 Stat. 3430 (1935) (Fort Jefferson); Pres.
Proc. No. 1733, reprinted in 43 Stat. 1988 (1925) (Glacier Bay). For the manage-
ment plans for the resources of three of these national monuments, see 36 C.F.R.
§ 7.27 (1977) (Fort Jefferson); id § 7.73 (1977) (Buck Island Reef); id. § 7.84 (1977)
(Channel Islands). All national monuments are subject to the regulations of the
National Park Service. 36 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-60.17 (1977). See also The Antiquities Act
of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
112. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 83.
113. 408 F. Supp. at 910.
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exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.1'"14 One interpreta-
tion of natural resources is found in the International Law Commis-
sion report on the proposed Convention on the Continental Shelf,"15
which reads: "It is clearly understood that the rights in question do
not cover objects such as wrecked ships and their cargoes (including
bullion) lying on the seabed or covered by the sand of the subsoil."116
The court reasoned that even liberal interpretation of natural re-
sources in the OCSLA would be ineffective to acquire jurisdiction for
the federal government because the Geneva Convention on the Conti-
nental Shelf supersedes any incompatible terminology in that Act."'
To support its reasoning, the court cited United States v. Ray,118
which held that "[t]o the extent that any of the terms of the [OCSLA]
are inconsistent with the later enacted Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf they should be superseded." 1 9 However, Treasure
Salvors, Inc. does not acknowledge the fact that the Ray court
continued: "IT]here is nothing in the pertinent language of the Gene-
va Convention on the Continental Shelf which detracts from or is
inconsistent with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. To the
contrary, the Geneva Convention confirms and crystalizes the exclu-
siveness of those rights."'12 0 Thus, United States v. Ray does not
appear to support this part of the Treasure Salvors, Inc. holding. In
addition, when the United States ratified the Geneva Law of the Sea
Conventions,121 the Senate gave its advice and consent with the
114. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 83, art. 2(1). (emphasis
added). The Convention defines natural resources as "the mineral and other
non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil, together with living organisms
belonging to sedentary species." Id. art. 2(4). See also the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 322.
115. 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 40, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1966).
116. Id. at 42.
117. 408 F. Supp. at 910.
118. 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970). United States v. Ray concerned a claim to an
area of the Florida Reef approximately four miles offshore. The individual
claimants sought to build up the submerged reef to create a new island nation.
They intended to dredge the seabed and to place the fill on the submerged reef,
but inevitably this action would destroy a valuable resource-coral. The issue
was whether the United States has the authority to regulate activities that are
deleterious to the natural resources of the outer continental shelf. The court
concluded that it did, so the federal government successfully asserted its right to
protect these resources.
119. Id. at 21.
120. Id.
121. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at
Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.LA.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205;
Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
understanding that no federal law would be superseded by their
ratification.
12
The United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf and
Underwater Archaeological Resources
It is not unreasonable to view the Law of the Sea Conventions as
contracts between nations. By ratifying the Conventions, the sig-
natories have agreed, for example, "that if the coastal State does not
explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one
may undertake these activities or make claim to the continental shelf
without the express consent of the coastal State."'12 3 The technologic-
ally advanced nations thus have consented not to exploit the natural
resources of the continental shelves of developing countries without
the latters' consent.
The rationale underlying the International Law Commission's re-
port that underwater archaeological resources are outside the scope
of the Convention on the Continental Shelf is not clear.124 It can be
surmised, however, that minerals, fish, and other natural resources
were included because they may comprise a significant portion of the
economic livelihood of the signatory States. Perhaps exploitation of
submerged antiquities-of far less economic consequence-was
thought not to warrant a place in this type of an international
cooperative agreement. Whatever the true rationale, this explanation
is as plausible as any yet articulated. 125
The conclusion, then, is that the drafters of the Conventions in-
tended to leave regulation of activities concerning submerged anti-
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the High Seas, done at
Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
122. See 106 CONG. REC. 11,188 (1960) (remarks of Sen. Mansfield, then Chair-
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "[N]o State or Federal law will
be overridden by the [four Law of the Sea Conventions negotiated in Geneva in
1958].").
123. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 83, art. 2(2).
124. See id. Article 5(1) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf purports
to guarantee the right of "fundamental oceanographic or other scientific re-
search," and exploitation of the shelf must not result in any "Unjustifiable
interference" with such research. Article 5(8) provides, however: "The consent
of the coastal state shall be obtained in respect of any research concerning the
continental shelf and undertaken there." For a proposal to resolve this ambigui-
ty, see Korthals Altes, Submarine Antiquities: A Legal Labyrinth, 4 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 77 (1976). "A sound interpretation would be that the Continen-
tal Shelf Convention is only concerned with the non-living mineral resources of
the continental shelf, while research on any other items is beyond its scope." Id.
at 80.
125. See Korthals Altes, Submarine Antiquities: A Legal Labyrinth, 4 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & Com 77, 79-80 (1976).
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quities to other legal processes rather than to add more issues to an
already complex international agreement. If this conclusion is valid,
it would be entirely appropriate for a State to unilaterally legislate
regulation of exploitation of underwater archaeological resources.
This position is essentially that of the United States in its attempts to
extend the national policy of historic preservation to the seabed.
The Rule in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel
In Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel,'2 6 the court
concluded that possession and title were rightly conferred upon the
finders of the vessel. 27 After reasoning that the United States did not
have jurisdiction over submerged antiquities on the continental
shelf, the court determined that the Antiquities Act 12 8 and the Aban-
doned Property Act 2 9 did not secure any government interest in the
vessel. "Congress," said the court, "has not exercised its sovereign
prerogative to the extent necessary to justify a claim to an abandoned
vessel on the outer continental shelf."' 130 In summarizing the preced-
ing analyses of the doctrine of sovereign prerogative,' 3 ' the Aban-
doned Property Act, 3 2 and jurisdiction over the seabed,133 perhaps it
would be reasonable to conclude that a different holding might have
been more appropriate.
First, the Treasure Salvors, Inc. court concluded that it was bound
to follow an American Rule of sovereign prerogative.3 4 Whether a
distinct American Rule exists, however, is not altogether certain.3 5
Moreover, even though the issue of devolution remains unresolved,
some recent decisions holding for the sovereign under similar cir-
cumstances 3 6 indicate that courts in the United States are not neces-
sarily bound to follow an American Rule. Thus, Treasure Salvors,
126. 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2151 (5th Cir.
Apr. 28, 1976).
127. Id. at 911.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
129. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970).
130. 408 F. Supp. at 911.
131. See text accompanying notes 36-70 supra.
132. See text accompanying notes 71-82 supra.
133. See text accompanying notes 91-125 supra.
134. 408 F. Supp. at 909.
135. See text accompanying notes 45-63 supra.
136. See 371 F. Supp. 356 (1973), rev'd and remanded with directions to
dismiss, 508 F.2d 1113 (1975); 273 N.C. 399, 160 S.E.2d 482 (1968). See also note 48
and text accompanying notes 61-69 supra.
Inc. might have reasonably reached a different conclusion on this
issue and conferred possession and title upon the sovereign.
Second, Treasure Salvors, Inc. may have been unduly restrictive in
its interpretation of the provisions and purpose of the Abandoned
Property Act.137 This Act might be reasonably acknowledged as a
legislative assertion of the sovereign's prerogative to any abandoned
property within the jurisdiction of the United States that might be
acquired for the beneficial use of the sovereign. 138
Although application of the Abandoned Property Act was initially
restricted to Civil War properties, its scope was apparently expanded
during codification. 139 At present, for example, it is routinely used in
conjunction with federal antiquities legislation to administer feder-
ally owned historic properties.140 Thus, the Treasure Salvors, Inc.
court might have reasonably reached a different conclusion on this
issue as well.
Third, concerning jurisdiction over submerged antiquities, Treas-
ure Salvors, Inc. concluded that United States' jurisdiction extended
only to "minerals in and under the continental shelf.' 4' However,
the Truman Proclamation, 142 the SLA, and the OCSLA' 43 appear to
extend jurisdiction to the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf
as well as to its natural resources.144 Thus, notwithstanding the re-
port of the International Law Commission 14 on the Geneva Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf, 46 it might be reasonable to conclude
that the seabed of the continental shelf is "owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States."'147 Therefore, the provisions of the
Antiquities Act 48 should be applicable to underwater archaeological
resources on the continental shelf.
Summary
The federal government intervened in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v.
Abandoned Sailing Vessel149 to attempt to impose strict excavation
137. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970).
138. See text accompanying notes 71-82 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
140. See note 79 supra.
141. 408 F. Supp. at 910.
142. Pres. Proc. No. 2667,3 C.F.R. 67 (1945), reprinted in 13 DEP'T STATE BULL.
485 (1945). See also text accompanying notes 91-96 supra.
143. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1343 (1970). See also text accompanying notes 97-111
supra.
144. See text accompanying notes 91-125 supra.
145. 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 40, U.N. Doc. A13159 (1966).
146. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 83.
147. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
148. Id.
149. 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2151 (5th Cir.
Apr. 28, 1976).
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standards on the salvors. The government sought to ensure that
maximum critical data, in addition to artifacts, were recovered
through the excavation. 150 However, in holding for the plaintiff and
against the United States, Treasure Salvors, Inc. repudiated the
national policy of historic preservation. Indeed, the decision stands
as a roadblock to extending this policy to the continental shelf.
The following section examines current federal and state anti-
quities legislation for its capacity to extend the national policy of
historic preservation to seabed antiquities. Modifications are sug-




In the United States the forerunner of all legislation concerning
archaeology is the Antiquities Act of 1906.151 This statute authorizes
the President "to declare. . . objects of historical or scientific inter-
est that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the
Government of the United States to be national monuments."' 15 2
Congress intended to preserve historic properties by "proper care
and management" under the direction of the federal government.153
The Secretaries of the Interior, Army, and Agriculture are authorized
to grant excavation permits to operations conducted under the aus-
pices of "reputable museums, universities, colleges, or other recog-
nized scientific or educational institutions"'15 4 and to promulgate
"uniform rules and regulations"'155 for interpretation of the Act and
application of its provisions. The Antiquities Act further provides for
a fine of up to $500.00 or imprisonment for up to ninety days, or both,
for any person who is convicted of "appropriating, excavating, injur-
ing or destroying any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or
150. Interview with Michael W. Reed, Attorney, Marine Resources Section,
Land and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, in
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 29, 1976).
151. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970). See also C. McGmsEY, PUBLIC ARCHAEOLOGY 102
(1972).
152. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
153. Id.
154. Id. § 432.
155. Id. § 433. See also 43 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.15 (1976).
object of antiquity situated upon [federally owned or controlled
lands] without the permission" of the appropriate Secretary."6
The Historic Sites Act
The Historic Sites Act of 1935157 is the second federal statute
affecting archaeology. This Act declares "that it is a national policy
to preserve for public use, historic sites, buildings, and objects of
national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of
the United States.' 158 The Secretary of the Interior, with the assist-
ance of an advisory board representing various scientific and histor-
ical fields, is responsible for cataloging archaeological sites of excep-
tional value and for effectuating the ends contemplated by the Act.15 9
The National Park Service currently shares this responsibility with
the Secretary.160
The National Historic Preservation Act
The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966161 is the most far-
reaching federal statute yet enacted for the protection and mainte-
nance of archaeological resources. It is, for instance, the most defini-
tive of the national policy to preserve historic sites and objects of
antiquity.16 This Act established the National Register of Historic
Places,163 which expands the cataloging system initiated by the Na-
tional Park Service under the Historic Sites Act. 64 More im-
portantly, however, this Act empowers the Secretary of the Interior
to fund activities for nominating sites for the National Register and
for maintaining them after they are declared to be historic sites. 65 In
156. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1970). Cf. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir.
1974) (penal provisions of Antiquities Act unconstitutionally vague). It might be
argued that the Antiquities Act was unconstitutionally applied only when the
defendant was prosecuted for dealing in "antiquities" that were three years old.
157. 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1970).
158. Id.
159. See id. § 465.
160. See id. § 467. See also 36 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-60.17 (1977).
161. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1970).
162. [T]he spirit and direction of the Nation is founded upon and reflected
in its historic past; ... the historical and cultural foundations of the
Nation should be preserved. . . in order to give a sense of orientation to
the American people; [and] it is ... necessary and appropriate for the
Federal Government to accelerate its historic preservation programs
and activities, [and] to give maximum encouragement to agencies and
individuals undertaking preservation [as well as] State and local govern-
ments.
Id.
163. See id. § 470a.
164. See id. § 465. See also Palacios & Johnson, An Overview ofArchaeology
and the Law: Seventy Years of Unexploited Protection for Prehistoric Re-
sources, 51 NoTRE DAME LAw. 706, 711 (1976).
165. See 16 U.S.C. § 470b (1970). "Matching grants-in-aid can also be awarded
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addition, an Advisory Council on Historic Preservation has been
established to recommend National Register nominations to
Congress and the President.
166
Protection and Preservation
It would be useful at this point to elaborate upon a distinction
made earlier 167 concerning two facets of historic preservation-pro-
tection and preservation. Protection of historic sites involves pre-
venting their intentional or inadvertant destruction; preservation
involves their upkeep or maintenance. These two facets of historic
preservation are not mutually exclusive, but protection necessarily
precedes preservation. This statement is especially true of ar-
chaeological sites at which the slightest disruption might destroy the
contextual significance of the artifacts.
to the states for their own programs for preservation of antiquities so long as
those programs are in accordance with a comprehensive state plan which has
been approved by the Secretary." Palacios & Johnson, An Overview of Ar-
chaeology and the Law: Seventy Years of Unexploited Protection for Prehis-
toric Resources, 51 NOTRE DAmE LAW. 706, 711 (1976).
166. 16 U.S.C. § 470i (1970) (council comprised of representatives from various
departments and agencies of federal government and individuals who have
significant interest and experience in matters concerning historic preservation).
The following criteria are used to guide the states, federal agencies, and the
Secretary of the Interior in evaluating entries for the National Register:
The quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeolo-
gy and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and
objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials,
workmanship, feeling, and association, and:
A. that are associated with events that have made a significant contri-
bution to the broad patterns of our history; or
B. that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past;
or
C. that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period or
method of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or
that possess high artistic values, or that represent a significant and
distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual dis-
tinction; or
D. that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important
in prehistory or history.
Ordinarily cemeteries, birthplaces, or graves of historical figures, pro-
perties owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes,
structures that have been moved from their original locations, recon-
structed historic buildings, properties primarily commemorative in nat-
ure, and properties that have achieved significance within the past 50
years shall not be considered eligible for the National Register.
NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES at xv (1976). The text then lists excep-
tional circumstances under which sites qualify notwithstanding the above
characteristics. Id.
167. See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
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Despite its limited application,168 the Antiquities Act'69 appears to
be well suited for accomplishing protection of archaeological re-
sources because on its face it forbids unauthorized interference with
objects of antiquity.170 The Historic Sites Act' 7 1 and the National
Historic Preservation Act 172 appear to be better suited for accom-
plishing preservation after protection has been effectuated. Accord-
ing to these latter two Acts, protection follows inclusion on the
National Register, and the protective mechanism may be inoperative
before the antiquity is declared to be an historic site. However,
because protection of antiquities may be effectuated automatically
according to the Antiquities Act, this Act may be the most important
federal statute for initially protecting archaeological resources, in-
cluding those underwater. Subsequently, preservation may be ac-
complished according to the Historic Sites Act and the National
Historic Preservation Act.
The Applicability of Federal Antiquities Legislation to Under-
water Archaeological Resources
Notwithstanding the holding of Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Aban-
doned Sailing Vessel,' 7T the provisions of the Antiquities Act 174
should be applicable to historic property located on the seabed of the
continental shelf because this seabed is "controlled by the Govern-
ment of the United States."'1 75 Moreover, the jurisdictional problems
encountered by the government in Treasure Salvors, Inc. might be
avoided by a simple amendment to the Antiquities Act. The first
section of the Act should be revised to read, "objects of historic or
scientific interest that are situated upon lands, including submerged
lands, owned or controlled by the Government.' 176 This revision
would indicate Congressional intent to extend the national policy of
historic preservation to the seabed and would incidentally be an
adequate legislative assertion of sovereign prerogative. 177
168. The Antiquities Act is concerned with antiquities "that are situated upon
lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States." 16 U.S.C. §
431 (1970).
169. Id.
170. The Antiquities Act authorizes sanctions against any person "who shall
appropriate, excavate, injure or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or
monument, or object of antiquity." Id. § 433.
171. Id. § 461.
172. Id. § 470.
173. 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2151 (5th Cir.
Apr. 28, 1976).
174. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
175. Id. See also text accompanying notes 91-125 supra,
176. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970) (emphasis indicates suggested revision).
177. The suggested revision would probably enable a litigator to persuade a
court of the Congressional intent that the provisions of the Antiquities Act
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At present, some evidence of such an intent exists. Several national
monuments that include submerged lands, for example, have been
created under the authority of the Antiquities Act.178 Shipwrecks and
other submarine historic properties within the circumference of na-
tional monument areas are protected by regulations promulgated by
the Department of the Interior.
17 9
Once the jurisdictional problems are overcome, underwater ar-
chaeological resources could be protected and preserved through the
same procedure currently used for historic preservation of terrestrial
antiquities.180 Following this procedure, the Department of the Inte-
rior would issue an excavation permit, which is a prerequisite to
artifact recovery.18' To qualify for a permit, treasure hunters either
would be required to demonstrate their capability to work a proper
excavation' 82 or would have to agree to be accompanied by govern-
ment-approved underwater archaeologists to supervise their work.
83
In addition, under the Abandoned Property Act'84 they would have to
contract with the Administrator of General Services to keep any of
the artifacts they recover.185 The government would thereby retain its
representative sample for museum display, leaving the remainder to
the treasure hunters as an incentive to pursue the excavation.
should be applicable to submerged antiquities on the outer continental shelf.
Interview with Michael W. Reed, Attorney, Marine Resources Section, Land and
Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Dec. 29, 1976).
178. See note 111 supra.
179. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 7.27, 7.73, & 7.84 (1977).
180. Interview with George R. Fischer, Southeast Archaeological Center, Na-
tional Park Service, Tallahassee, Florida, in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (Jan. 6,
1977).
181. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.9 (1977).
182. "Permits will be granted ... to reputable museums, universities,
colleges, or other recognized scientific or educational institutions." Id. § 3.3.
Applications for permits are referred to the Smithsonian Institution for recom-
mendation. See id. § 3.8.
183. "The field officer in charge may at all times examine... all work done
under such permit." Id. § 3.14.
184. 40 U.S.C. § 310 (1970).
185. The Abandoned Property Act authorizes the Administrator of General
Services to "make such contracts and provisions as he [or she] may deem for the
interest of the government, for the preservation, sale, or collection" of
federally owned objects of antiquity. Id. See also text accompanying notes 71-82
supra.
The Federal Government as Intervenor in Treasure Salvors, Inc.
v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel
The federal government had a threefold purpose186 when it inter-
vened in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Abandoned Sailing Vessel. 187 First,
it sought to protect the archaeological integrity of the wreck site
through the provisions of the Antiquities Act by requiring the salvors
to conduct a systematic, scientific excavation in accordance with the
procedure outlined in the preceding section.188 Second, it sought to
retain a representative sample of the recovered artifacts for the
edification of the people of the United States. And third, it sought to
establish a precedent under existing legislation (in the absence of a
comprehensive federal underwater antiquities statute) for protecting
and preserving valuable submerged historic properties.
Currently the government's attempt to establish a precedent for
historic preservation of seabed antiquities must rely upon legislation
that never contemplated underwater archaeology. This even now
nascent discipline was virtually nonexistent in 1906 when the Anti-
quities Act was enacted. 89 Consequently, marine historic preserva-
tion is hindered by jurisdictional questions like those arising in
Treasure Salvors, Inc. and by the cumbersome task of extracting
principles from legislation designed for terrestrial antiquities and
attempting to apply them to submerged antiquities. A comprehensive
underwater antiquities statute, a proposed draft of which follows,
would alleviate many of these problems. 90 But first, in order to
provide a point of reference for this statute, current state antiquities
legislation will be examined.
State Antiquities Legislation
In 1965, Florida became the first state to expressly include under-
water archaeological resources in its antiquities legislation.191 Since
186. Interview with Michael W. Reed, Attorney, Marine Resources Section,
Land and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, in
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 29, 1976).
187. 408 F. Supp. 907 (S.D. Fla. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-2151 (5th Cir.
Apr. 28, 1976).
188. See text accompanying notes 180-85 supra.
189. The Antiquities Act of 1906, Act of June 8, 1906, ch. 3060, §§ 1-4, 34 Stat.
225.
190. See A Model Underwater Antiquities Statute, pp. 660-62 infra.
191. The Antiquities Act of 1965 was enacted after substantial amounts of
treasure were found in Florida's territorial waters. FLA. STAT. §§ 267.01-267.08
(1965), 1965 Fla. Laws ch. 66-300, §§ 1-8. This Act was soon replaced by the
more comprehensive Archives and History Act of 1967. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
267.011-267.14 (West 1975), 1967 Fla. Laws ch. 67-50, §§ 1-11. See also Note,
Abandoned Property: Title to Treasure Recovered in Florida's Territorial
Waters, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 360 (1969) (discusses development of Florida statute).
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then, eight other states have followed Florida's lead.192 The SLAI93
enables the states to extend historic preservation to seabed anti-
quities by extending their jurisdiction to "the lands beneath the
navigable waters"' 94 to "a line three geographical miles distant from
[their coastlines]."'95 The more important provisions of these state
statutes vary, sometimes drastically, but nevertheless, they provide a
touchstone for a model underwater antiquities statute.196 The main
provisions concern title and definition, exploration and excavation
permits, and artifact disposition.
Title and Definitions
The state submerged antiquities statutes usually begin by defining
underwater archaeological resources and vesting title to them in the
state. The states are thus empowered to regulate excavations and to
prohibit unauthorized interference with state-owned historic pro-
perties. 97
Definitions of submerged antiquities range from simply "sunken or
abandoned ships,"' 98 to "wrecks of the sea and any part or the
contents thereof,"'99 to "all shipwrecks, vessels, cargoes, tackle, and
underwater archaeological artifacts. . . lying on the. . . bottoms of
[state territorial waters]." 2 0 Age qualifications for the artifacts vary
from "unclaimed for more than 10 years,"'20 ' to "pre-twentieth cen-
192. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 91, § 63 (West Supp. 1977), 1973 Mass. Acts
ch. 989, § 5; Miss. CODE ANN. § 6192-101 to 6192-123 (Cum. Supp. 1972), 1970 Miss.
Laws ch. 267, § 1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-22 to 121-28 (Supp. 1967), 1967 N.C. Sess.
Laws ch. 533 §§ 1-8, as amended by 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 476, § 48; R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-45.1-1 to 42-45.1-13 (1977), 1974 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 161, § 1; S.C. CODE §
54-321 to 54-328 (Cum. Supp. 1975), 1968 S.C. Acts (55) 3077; TEx. CIv. CODE ANN.
tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 1-22 (Vernon 1970), 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 61st Leg., 2d C.S.,
at 98, ch. 2, emerg. eff. Sept. 10, 1969; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 701-791 (Supp.
1977), 1975 Vt. Acts No. 109, § 4; VA. CODE § 10-136 to 10-145.9 (Cum. Supp. 1977),
1976 Va. Acts ch. 579.
193. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
194. Id. § 1311.
195. Id. § 1312. But see id. § 1301 (Florida and Texas received three marine
leagues, or nine geographical miles, along the Gulf Coast.). See also United
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960).
196. See A Model Underwater Antiquities Statute, pp. 660-62 infra.
197. Again, it must be emphasized that the moral significance of this entitle-
ment is beyond the scope of this Note.
198. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 261.061 (West 1975).
199. TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 5 (Vernon 1970).
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-22 (1977).
201. Id.; R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-45.1-3(d) (1977); S.C. CODE § 54-321 (Cum. Supp.
1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 701(10) (Supp. 1977).
tury,' 20 2 to "unclaimed for one hundred years or more. '20 3 The lan-
guage vesting title in the state varies similarly.0 4
The variety of definitions and age standards signals potential
problems. Often, for example, vessels stranded in hurricanes have
struck reefs, breaking up gradually and over a considerable distance.
A wreck site, therefore, may extend for several miles, transgressing
state boundaries. 0 5 Parts of such a wreck located in one jurisdiction
might be protected objects of antiquity, while other parts found in
another jurisdiction might lack antiquity status. Protecting and pre-
serving a wreck site under these conditions probably would be im-
possible. Thus, uniform principles appear to be necessary in order to
prevent potential conflict between states and between a state and the
federal government, and possibly even to encourage cooperation
among them.
Exploration and Excavation Permits
Although permit provisions vary, they usually specify to whom
permits may be issued,206 the geographic area to which the permit is
confined,2 0 7 its duration,208 and cost.209 Some states have different
202. Miss. CODE ANN. § 6192-105 (Cum. Supp. 1972); Tsx. Civ. CODE ANN. tit.
106, art. 6145, § 5 (Vernon 1970).
203. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 180 (West Supp. 1977).
204. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.061(1)(b) (West 1975) ("[ojbjects having...
historical and archaeological value which have been abandoned on... state-
owned lands or state-owned sovereignty submerged lands shall belong to the
state"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-22 (1974) ("title to all bottoms of navigable waters
within one marine league seaward from the Atlantic seashore.., and the title
to all shipwrecks ... lying on the said bottoms ... is hereby declared to be in
the State"); TEx. CiV. CODE ANN. tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 5 (Vernon 1970) (defines the
material and labels it "State Archaeological Landmarks ... the sole property of
the State"). See also MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 6, § 180 (West Supp. 1977);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 6192-105 (Cum. Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-4 (1977);
S.C. CODE § 54-321 (Cum. Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 782 (Supp. 1977);
VA. CODE § 10-145.9 B (Cum. Supp. 1977).
205. Interview with Duncan R. Mattewson, State Underwater Archaeologist,
Bureau of Historic Sites and Properties, Florida, in Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
(Jan. 7, 1977).
206. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975) ("to institutions ... properly
qualified . .. , provided such activity is undertaken by reputable museums,
universities, colleges, or other historical, scientific, or educational institutions");
MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 6, § 180 (West Supp. 1977) ("to qualified persons...
for the orderly salvage or removal of underwater archaeological resources");
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-25 (1974) ("any qualified person, firm or corporation
desiring to conduct any type of exploration, recovery or salvage operations").
See also R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-45.1-5 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 782 (Supp.
1977); VA. CODE § 10-145.9 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
207. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, §
63 (West Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6192-109 (Cum. Supp. 1972); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 121-25 (1974); S.C. CODE § 54-323 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Txx. Crv. CODE ANN.
tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 10 (Vernon 1970); VA. CODE § 10-145.9 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
208. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 91, § 63 (West Supp. 1977) ("[slaid permits
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permits for exploration and excavation.210 The state antiquities
committees in charge of administering historic properties21' may
issue permits when they believe 212 such action would serve the best
shall include... [the] time period covered"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-25 (1974)
("for such a period of time ... as the Department may deem to be in the best
interest of the State"). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 6192-109 (Cum. Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-5 (1977); S.C. CODE. §
54-326 (Cum. Supp. 1975); TEx. Cmy. CODE. ANN. tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 10 (Vernon
1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 782 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 10-145.9 (Cum. Supp.
1977).
209. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, § 63 (West Supp. 1977) ("not to exceed
one hundred dollars"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-25 (1974) ("monetary fee to be set
by the Department"). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-45.1-5 (1977); S.C. CODE § 54-322 (Cum. Supp. 1975); TEx. Crv. CODE
ANN. tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 10 (Vernon 1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 782 (Supp.
1977); VA. CODE § 10-145.9 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See Beall, State Regulation of
Search for and Salvage of Sunken Treasure, 4 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 1, 6 (1971)
(salvage bond may be as high as $15,000 in Florida).
210. See Beall, State Regulation of Search for and Salvage of Sunken Treas-
ure, 4 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 1, 6-7 (1971) (discusses Florida's exploration and
salvage permits, and Texas permits for survey and reconnaissance, testing,
excavation, and recording rock art).
211. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.031 (West 1975) (the Division of Archives,
History, and Research Management); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 179 (West
Supp. 1977) (the Board of Underwater Archaeological Resources); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 6192-110 (Cum. Supp. 1972) (the Board of Trustees of the Department of
Archives and History); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-23 (1974) (the Department of Cul-
tural Resources); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-5 (1977) (the State Historical Preserva-
tion Commission); S.C. CODE § 54-322 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (the South Carolina
Institute of Archaeology and Anthropology, University of South Carolina); T~x.
CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 3 (Vernon 1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 701
(Supp. 1977) (the Division of Historic Preservation); VA. CODE § 10-145.9 (Cum.
Supp. 1977) (the Virginia Historic Landmarks Commission). The Massachusetts
statute provides that
[t]he board shall consist of the state archaeologist, the state archivist, the
commissioner of waterways,. . . the director of mineral resources,....
and five members to be appointed by the governor, who shall include
one representative of the Massachusetts Historical Commission, one
marine archaeologist, one law enforcement specialist, and two qualified
or certified divers, one to be chosen from a list submitted by recognized
diving organizations.
The Texas Antiquities Committee is
to be composed of seven (7) members, namely: The Director of the State
Historical Survey Committee, the Director of the State Parks and Wild-
life .Department, the Commissioner of the General Land Office, the
State Archeologist, and the following citizen members, to-wit: one pro-
fessional archeologist from a recognized museum or institution of high-
er learning in Texas, one professional historian with expertise in Texas
history and culture, and the Director of the Texas Memorial Museum of
The University of Texas.
212. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975) ("to institutions which the
division may deem to be properly qualified"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 180
(West Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6192-101 (Cum. Supp. 1972) ("as in the
opinion of the board"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-25 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-5
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interests of the state 13 and when it appears "that the maximum
amount of historic, scientific, archaeologic and educational informa-
tion may be recovered and preserved in addition to the physical
recovery of items. ' 214 Various sanctions are imposed for unau-
thorized interference with state historic properties and for violation
of any of the conditions of the permits.215
Artifact Disposition
The final significant provision of state underwater antiquities stat-
utes concerns the disposition of recovered artifacts. Treasure hunting
is a profit-seeking commercial enterprise requiring operating capit-
al, and treasure hunters usually sell artifacts they recover in order to
finance future ventures. Carefully drafted regulations might accom-
modate this need as well as the need to curtail destructive practices
and encourage proper scientific excavations. 16
(1977); S.C. CODE § 54-323 (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("[If the Institution shall find");
TEX. Civ. CODE ANN. tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 10 (Vernon 1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 782 (Supp. 1977) ("[tjhe director, with the advice of the state archeologist, may
grant ... a permit... as he [or she] may deem"); VA. CODE § 10-145.9 (Cum.
Supp. 1977).
213. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91 §
63 (West Supp. 1977) ("and said operations are in the public interest"); Miss,
CODE ANN. § 6192-110 (Cum. Supp. 1972) ("as in the opinion of the board would
be in the best interest of the State of Mississippi"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-25
(1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-5 (1977); S.C. CODE § 54-323 (Cum. Supp. 1975);
TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 10 (Vernon 1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 782 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 10-145.9 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
214. VA. CODE § 10-145.9 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
215. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.13 (West 1975) ("a misdemeanor punishable by
a fine not exceeding $500 or by imprisonment in the County jail for a period not
to exceed 6 months or both"); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 91, § 63 (West Supp.
1977) (the statute provides for "a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more
than one thousand dollars, imprisonment for six months, or both, and shall
forfeit any underwater archaeological resources he [or she] has obtained there-
by. In addition his [or her] permit, if any, shall be subject to revocation or
suspension"). See also iss. CODE ANN. § 6192-117 (Cum. Supp. 1972); NC. GEN.
STAT. § 121-28 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-45.1-12 (1977); S.C. CODE § 54-321 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); TEx. Crv. CODE ANN. tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 17 (Vernon 1970); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 791 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 10-145.9E (Cum. Supp. 1977).
216. On the one hand, it is important to avoid discouraging treasure hunting
altogether because some treasure hunters are bona fide archaeologists who are
labelled treasure hunters because they trade in artifacts to finance their excava-
tions. Because of their commercial interest, treasure hunters are often responsi-
ble -for developing new techniques to facilitate artifact recovery. Moreover, in
their search for treasure ships, they locate and chart many wrecks that would
not be financially lucrative to excavate but that have archaeological signifi-
cance nevertheless. Interview with Robert F. Marx, President, Seafinders, Inc.,
in New York City (Jan. 8, 1977).
On the other hand, some underwater archaeologists are vehemently opposed
to treasure hunting under any circumstances. They believe that there are ways
to finance excavation without trading in artifacts and that trading in priceless
historic properties is immoral. Remarks made by Jeremy N. Green, Maritime
Archaeology Department, Western Australia Museum, during a Panel Discus-
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The states appear to accomplish this compromise by regulating the
quality of excavations through permits 17 and by contracting to dis-
pose of the recovered artifacts between the treasure hunters and the
state. Disposition may be a statutorily imposed percentage split21 8 or
a fair share of the objects recovered. 219 In some cases the state may
choose to compensate the treasure hunter with the reasonable cash
value of the artifacts.220 The disposition contracts enable states to
retain a representative sample of the artifacts for their museums
while providing the treasure hunters with the means to capitalize
future undertakings.
Summary
The state and federal governments in the United States have ac-
knowledged the national policy of historic preservation through a
variety of antiquities statutes. Unfortunately, however, the current
statutory framework provides for only marginal historic preserva-
tion of underwater archaeological resources.
On the one hand, at the federal level, historic preservation of
submerged antiquities is hindered by jurisdictional problems. These
problems arise from efforts to extend historic preservation to the
seabed, using statutes that were not designed to accommodate
conflicting interests in underwater archaeological resources.
Nevertheless, a theoretical basis2 21 apparently exists for extending
current federal antiquities legislation to the outer continental shelf;
however, the procedure is unwieldy and consequently impracticable.
On the other hand, a few states have explicitly included provisions
for the preservation of submerged archaeological resources in their
antiquities statutes. These states are thus able to regulate treasure
sion at the Eighth International Conference of Underwater Archeologists, in
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (Jan. 7, 1977).
217. See text accompanying notes 206-15 supra. See also Beall, State Regu-
lation of Search for and Salvage of Sunken Treasure, 4 NAT. REsouRcEs LAw. 1,
6-7 (1971).
218. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, § 63 (West Supp. 1977) (permittee may
retain 75% of recovered artifacts, or fair market value).
219. See S.C. CODE § 54-323 (Cum. Supp. 1975); TEX. Crv. CODE ANN. tit. 106,
art. 6145-9, § 9 (Vernon 1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 782 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §
10-146C (Cum. Supp. 1977).
220. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 91, § 63 (West Supp. 1977) ("the Common-
wealth... shall have first option to purchase within six months said resources
at fair market value"). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-28 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 782 (Supp. 1977).
221. See text accompanying notes 126-90 supra.
hunting activities within their territorial seas, thereby preventing
wanton destruction of archaeological sites and fostering historic
preservation. However, fundamental variations from state to state in
the statutory provisions may leave insurmountable gaps in the pro-
tective network. The potential confusion indicates a pressing need
for uniform principles.
A MODEL UNDERWATER ANTQUITIES STATUTE
The following statute was designed as a model for the federal
government and for those states that at present have no provisions
for underwater archaeological resources in their antiquities statutes.
In addition, current statutes might be amended to incorporate these
principles in order to promote uniformity.
Section 1. Title to Underwater Archaeological Resources is Vested
in the State222
(A) Title to the seabed and subsoil of all navigable watersm within
the jurisdiction of the State2 4 and title to all underwater archaeolog-
ical resources lying in or on the seabed and subsoil remaining aban-
doned and unclaimed for fifty years or more225 will be in the State. All
the seabed, subsoil, and underwater archaeological resources will be
subject to the exclusive dominion and control of the State.226
(B) Underwater Archaeological Resources will be given its broad-
est possible meaning to include any remnants of past civilization or
other human achievement, including but not limited to, sunken
wrecks and other vessels and all parts or remnants thereof, submerg-
ed harbors and cities, and all former habitation sites.
222. For purposes of the Model Statute, State means any state government or
the federal government.
223. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1343 (1970) (Submerged Lands Act and Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act).
224. It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that.., title
to and ownership of the lands beneath the navigable waters within the
boundaries of the respective states, and the natural resources within
such lands and waters ... are ... recognized, confirmed, established
and vested in and assigned to the respective States.
Id. § 1311.
The seaward boundary of each original coastal state is approved and
confirmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its coastline.
Id. § 1312.
225. See note 166 supra (fifty-year standard in National Register of Historic
Places). One hundred years may be too long. See MAss. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 6, §
180 (West Supp. 1977). Ten years may be too recent and might lead to confusion
between the law of salvage and the law of underwater archaeology. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 121-22 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-45.1-3 (1977); S.C. CODE § 54-321
(Cum. Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 701(10) (Supp. 1977). Pre-twentieth
Century is too inflexible because to qualify as an historic wreck a vessel must
be older with each succeeding year. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 6192-105 (Cune. Supp.
1972); TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. tit. 106, art. 6145-9, § 10 (Vernon 1970).
226. This provision should be an adequate legislative assertion of sovereign
prerogative. See text accompanying notes 45-70 supra.
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Section 2. The Board of Underwater Archaeological Resources
(A) The custodian of underwater archaeological resources will be
the Board of Underwater Archaeological Resources, 7 which will be
comprised of seven members appointed by the State antiquities
committee and which will be empowered to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to protect, preserve, maintain,
and excavate underwater archaeological resources so that maximum
historic, cultural, scientific, and educational information may be re-
covered.
(B) The Board is authorized to establish a professional staff
comprised of professional underwater archaeologists and advisors
representing historical, cultural, scientific, and educational organiza-
tions for the purpose of supervising protection, preseivation, mainte-
nance, and systematic excavation of underwater archaeological re-
sources.
(C) The Board is authorized with the approval of two-thirds of its
members to issue Exploration Permits and Excavation or Salvage
Permits to individuals or organizations representing reputable
museums, universities, colleges, or other recognized scientific or edu-
cational institutions 2 8 or otherwise demonstrating capability to so
conduct these activities as to promote the interests of history, cul-
ture, science, and education. The permits may stipulate to supervision
by a staff member of the Board who may examine the activities of the
permitees at any time. Detailed reports that comply with standards
specified by the Board will be submitted to the Board at designated
intervals. The permits will be limited to a designated geographic area
that shall be inclusive, in the exploration permits, of an area not to
exceed twenty-five square miles, and in the excavation or salvage
permits, of an area not to exceed four square miles.229 No permit will
issue to an area already designated in another permit until the expira-
tion or cancellation of the prior permit.
The duration of the permits will be not more than six months for
exploration permits and not more than two years for excavation or
salvage permits. Permits will be renewable within thirty days before
expiration at the option of the permittee and subject to approval by
the Board. Such approval will be conditioned on the permittee's
compliance with the standards set forth in this section. Permits may
be revoked by the Board if at a public hearing, two-thirds of the
members of the Board determine that the permittee has failed to
comply with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board.
Section 3. Disposition Contracts
(A) The Board is authorized to contract with excavation permittees
for the disposition of all recovered artifacts.
227. For purposes of the Model Statute, it is assumed that a State antiquities
committee already exists to administer terrestrial antiquities. The Board of
Underwater Archaeological Resources would become a part of this committee.
228. See 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1970).
229. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West 1975) (three square miles for excava-
tion permit).
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(B) At the discretion of the Board, the permittee will be entitled to
retain up to seventy-five percent, but no less than fifty percent, of the
recovered artifacts. The contract will stipulate that the Board will be
entitled to select a representative sample of the artifacts for museum
purposes within the restrictions outlined above.
(C) The Board is empowered to negotiate with the excavation per-
mittees for compensating the permittees with the reasonable cash
value of the artifacts when they appear to be of special historical or
cultural significance. The State will have the first option to pur-
chase, through the Board, within six months, the recovered artifacts
at fair market value.
Section 4. Violations
Any person 23 0 violating a provision of this statute will be punishable
by a fine of not more than one-thousand dollars, imprisonment for up
to six months, or both, and will forfeit any underwater archaeological
resources obtained thereby. In addition, his or her permit, if any has
been issued, will be subject to revocation or suspension at the discre-
tion of the Board.
CONCLUSION
Underwater archaeological resources continue to reveal significant
facets of the mosaic comprising our heritage. Unfortunately, gaps in
the current statutory framework hinder attempts to extend the na-
tional policy of historic preservation to cover the seabed. The law of
marine antiquities is a labyrinth, but the basic principles presented
in the model statute might lead us out of the maze toward the goal of
extending historic preservation seaward.
JAMES KEVIN MEENAN
230. "Person" includes juridical persons.
